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Abstract This chapter introduces the concept of Critical Infrastructure (CI).
Although old civilisations had CI, the protection and resilience of CI has come to the
fore again in the last two decades. The risk to society due to inadvertent and deliberate
CI disruptions has largely increased due to interrelation, complexity, and depen-
dencies of these infrastructures. The increased use of information and telecommu-
nication technologies (ICT) to support, monitor, and control CI functionalities has
contributed to this. The interest in CI and complex systems is strongly related to
initiatives by several governments that from the end of the 90s of the previous century
recognised the relevance of the undisturbed functioning of CI for the wellbeing of
their population, economy, and so on. Their policies highlighted early the increasing
complexity of CI and the challenges of providing such CI services without disruption,
especially when accidental or malicious events occur. In recent years, most national
policies have evolved following a direction from protection towards resilience. The
need for this shift in perspective and these concepts are also analysed in this chapter.
1 Introduction
Old civilisations like the Romans already protected their Critical Infrastructure
(CI) such as aqueducts and the military roads. More recently, nations planned for
the protection of their key infrastructure elements such as power plants, bridges and
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harbours in the cold war era. In the relatively quiet 80s of the previous century the
protection efforts of these key points seemed to be less prominently needed. At the
same time, the risk to the society due to inadvertent and deliberate CI disruptions
gradually increased considerably. A number of colliding factors reinforcing the
recent CI-related risk increases:
(1) the diminishing governmental control due to liberalisation and privatisation of
infrastructures,
(2) the increased use of information and telecommunication technologies (ICT) to
support, monitor, and control CI functionalities,
(3) the idea of the population that services can and, above all, shall be available
24/7,
(4) urbanisation which stresses the utilisation of old infrastructures to their limits,
(5) the increasing interwovenness, (supply) chaining and dependencies of
infrastructural services,
(6) adversaries of the society who increasingly understand that a successful attack
may create havoc.
Several of these trends and their related risk to the society were recognised by the
Clinton Administration in the 90s. In response, the US Presidential Decision
Directive PDD-63 [1] set forth a set of actions in 1998. The PDD-63 deﬁned CI as
“those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the
economy and government”. Triggered by the PDD-63 and the millennium bug
(Y2K), some other nations (e.g. Canada) started their CI studies and protection
activities. In February 2001, Canada started its Ofﬁce of Critical Infrastructure
Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) within the Department of
National Defence organisational structure [2]. The 11/9 event triggered more nations
to put CI and their protection high on the list of their activities as the long forgotten
cold war infrastructure protection plans looked outdated and ineffective [3].
While there is not a commonly accepted deﬁnition of critical infrastructure (CI),
all deﬁnitions emphasise the contributing role of a CI to the society or the debili-
tating effect in the case of disruption [4]. On 17 November 2005, the European
Commission adopted a Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical
Infrastructure Protection [5]. In 2008, the European Council issued the Directive
2008/114/EC [6], which required the Member States to identify and designate
European CI (ECI) and assess the needs for their protection. This Directive deﬁned
‘critical infrastructure’ as:
An asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the
maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social
well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a signiﬁcant
impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions [6].
This directive referred to infrastructures of European dimension, but it triggered
several Member States to identify their national CI (NCI) as well. Currently, one
can ﬁnd many more nations who use an equivalent of this deﬁnition without the “in
a Member State” parts (see e.g. [4]). However, despite this common deﬁnition, an
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open question remains: “what exactly comprises CI?”. First of all, nations may
deﬁne critical sectors, e.g. telecommunications, energy, transportation, drinking
water, and more. Secondly, nations may deﬁne critical functions or services of these
sectors (e.g. the production of isotopes for cancer treatments). Looking deeper, one
may identify which components, parts, and subsystems have to be really considered
as a “critical” to the critical functions of critical sectors.
Moreover, it shall be noted that the European deﬁnition not only applies to
‘technical’ infrastructures but also to societal and soft infrastructures.
The directive also deﬁned the notion Critical Infrastructure Protection in an
all-hazard perspective: “all activities aimed at ensuring the functionality, conti-
nuity and integrity of critical infrastructures in order to deter, mitigate and neutralise
a threat, risk or vulnerability” [6].
2 Importance of Protection and Resilience
However, the most interesting question is why we need to increase our interest
about the protection and resilience of such systems. The answer to this question can
be found still in the PDD-63 that about 20 years ago stated:
Many of the nation’s critical infrastructures have historically been physically and logically
separate systems that had little interdependence. As a result of advances in information
technology and the necessity of improved efﬁciency, however, these infrastructures have
become increasingly automated and interlinked. These same advances have created new
vulnerabilities to equipment failure, human error, weather and other natural causes, and
physical and cyber attacks” [1].
Indeed as outlined above as well as noted in [7], many economic, social, political
and technological reasons have caused a rapid change in the organisational, oper-
ational and technical aspects of infrastructures. These infrastructures, that in the past
could be considered as autonomous vertically integrated systems with very few
points of contact with respect to other infrastructures, are now tightly coupled and
show large numbers of dependencies. This has generated many positive effects to
our society and the well-being of populations, but has increased the complexity, the
vulnerability of infrastructures and the related risk to our societies at the same time.
Several episodes emphasised such fragility. TNO has collected more than
9,550 CI disruption events which caused the failure of 12,400 infrastructure ser-
vices through cascading between 2005 and now. Some example events are
described in Table 1.
Even if the example incidents illustrated in Table 1 are very different in terms of
primary causes, extension and consequences, all of them are characterised by
non-intuitive dependencies and, especially, by inadequate protection measures to
manage the crisis. This is mainly due to the incomplete understanding of an event
and especially of its direct and indirect consequences [8, 9]. This is, unfortunately,
an effect of the increased complexity of the socio-technical scenario largely char-
acterised by the presence of dependencies among different CI.
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Table 1 Some example incidents of CI disruptions
1998
On May 19, 1998, the telecommunication satellite Galaxy IV spun out of control. That produced
many unexpected problems in North America for several days before another replacement
satellite could take over the services: about 40 million of pagers out-of-services causing major
problems to dispatch doctors and nurses in hospitals and to notify ﬁrst responders fast. CBS,
ABC, CNN and other media networks lost nation-wide transmission signals. Air transportation
was affected due to absence of high-altitude weather reports; 30 flights from Huston airport were
cancelled or delayed. At the highway: drivers could not perform refuel because gas-stations lost
the capability to process credit cards.
2001
On July 18, 2001, train wagons containing chloride acid derailed in a downtown tunnel in
Baltimore. Fire ﬁghters, in the absence of information about the presence of chloride acid on the
train, decided to let the train burn. Unknown was also that a high-pressure water mains, a set of
glass ﬁbres and a power transmission cable were located just up the same tunnel. Due to the ﬁre,
the water transport pipeline to downtown burst open. As a result over 70 million gallons of water
flooded downtown streets and houses; the drinking water supply failed, and the ﬁre ﬁghters lost
their water supply. Glass ﬁbres melted and caused a noticeable world-wide slowdown on the
internet and caused local and international telephony outages. Over 1200 buildings lost power.
2001
The collapse of Twin-towers due to the “9/11 events” caused the inoperability of many
infrastructures (electricity, water, gas, communication, steam distribution, metro, operations of
key ﬁnancial institutions) in a broad area of Manhattan. Moreover, the presence in that area of
important telco-nodes induced degradation in telecommunication and on Internet also outside
US. This large impact has been caused by the co-location of a multitude of vital CI inside the
World Trade Centre. Indeed in those building there were the Port Authority Emergency
Management centre, the Ofﬁce of Emergency Management Operations Center, electrical power
substations, steam and gas distribution, metro stations, further to be the headquarters of a number
of ﬁnancial institutions.
Moreover also the emergency operations were affected by such extreme co-location
For instance, the Verizon building 140 West St., contained 306,000 telephony and over 55,000
data lines from 30 operators and provided services to 34,000 customers in Lower Manhattan.
A set of these lines was connected to antennas for ﬁrst responders and mobile telephony at the
roof of the towers and adjacent buildings. The communication capacity for the ﬁrst responders
was almost immediately lost due the ﬁre and subsequent collapse of the WTC towers. Data and
telephony services failed as the Verizon building became damaged by falling debris. Lines were
cut and backup power was lost due to the flooding of batteries. Many of the communication
back-up lines for ﬁrst responders and agencies involved in disaster management were co-located
with the primary circuits and failed. The remaining ﬁxed and wireless communication for
emergency response failed as police did not allow Verizon to reﬁll the fuel tanks for their
back-up power generators at two other, still operating, communication switch locations. During
the recovery phase, police did not allow crews of all co-located operators to enter the closed-off
area; only crews of Verizon were allowed to work on repairs. Verizon T-shirts allowed repair
crews of AT&T and other telecommunication companies to enter the area and perform their
work.
2004
In the area on Rome (Italy) during the night of 31st December there was a problem at the
air-conditioning system of an important telecommunication node. The problem had not been
adequately managed causing an increased degradation up to the complete collapse of the node.
The telecommunication operator had no elements (neither information) to foresee which services
(continued)
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Indeed, as emphasised by the different studies performed on the emergency
response after 9/11, during such a crisis there was not a clear understanding of the
CI dependencies, and the need for CI protection. Moreover, the New York City
emergency preparedness plans did not account for total neighbourhood and facility
disasters. The emergency plans and back-up tapes with databases were inaccessible
as they were in the NY city hall which was powerless and inaccessible as a result of
the collapse of the two World Trade Center (WTC) towers. The Emergency
Operations Center at WTC 7 was destroyed and had to be relocated three times
during the emergency operations, something the operation plans did not prepare for.
Finally emergency plans developed by CI operators and ﬁnancial institutions did
take into account the possibility of multiple CI failure, all of them considered a
scenario where only their CI collapsed (see e.g. [10, 11]).
These events show that a more careful understanding of the set of CI, their
dependencies and common cause failure risk along with their full operational
conditions is needed. A ﬁrst step is to revisit analysis reports of earlier
disasters/emergencies to know the possible causes. Moreover, one can learn from
the potential consequences and of decisions taken by crisis response organisations
without of a clear understanding of the relationship between the different CI
Table 1 (continued)
would be impacted by the failure. They decided to not provide any warning while trying to solve
the problem internally. Unfortunately they were unable to manage the situation. The direct
consequence was the stop for some 6 h of all wired and mobile telephone communication in
large area of Rome. Moreover as an indirect consequence, more than 5000 bank and 3000 postal
ofﬁces nationwide were without communications. Moreover, 70% of check-in desks at Rome
airport were inoperable (with delays for several flights). Finally they were close to an electric
blackout because the electric distribution system operators abruptly lost the ability to supervise
and manage of half of Rome’s power grid.
2010
Mid April 2010, the Eyjafjallajoekull volcano on Island erupts through fast cooling ice cap (a
so-called VEI 4 class eruption). As a result glass particles are blown into air and transported to
Europe in several waves during a month. Depending on the jet stream, some 30 European nations
from Sweden to Turkey had to close down their airspace affecting hundred thousands of
passengers. Just-in-time transport by plane, e.g. of repair parts, as well as medicines and donor
organs for transplantation could not take place. The ﬁnancial loss for the tourist sector was 1
billion euro. The air transport industry lost 1.5–2.5 billion euro. The worldwide GDP impact was
5 billion US dollar.
2016
On January 4, 2016, a special weather condition caused a layer of ﬁve centimetre of black ice in
the northern part of The Netherlands which impacted various CI for several days. High voltage
lines develop a “wing proﬁle” causing dangling of the lines with power dips as a result. Hospitals
regard the risk of power outages too high and stopped all non-life threatening surgeries. Schools
are closed. Road and rail transport was not possible to a large extent. Milk collection at farms
was halted. Milk products cannot be produced anymore and distributed to supermarkets across a
larger part of the Netherlands. Schools were closed for days. The air force cannot scramble their
F16s anymore.
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services, CI elements, and actors (e.g. crisis management, CI operators). Such an
analysis will stress the relevance to have a good knowledge of all the infrastructures
and the services they provide, their element which operate (or are located) in a
given area, and of their dependencies. This means that one has to have at least
information about the geographical location of the most relevant components of the
different infrastructures, as well as their function within the whole infrastructure,
and possible single points of failure (also known as “key points”). Organisationally
one needs to have points of contact within each of the actor organisations as “one
shall not exchange business cards during an emergency”.
There is the need to have methodologies and tools to support the analysis of such
complex (critical) systems with earlier events as a starter. Indeed we have to
consider several elements that may reduce the effectiveness of analysis performed
exclusively on historical data. This is partly due to the increasing diffusion of ICT
technologies, which changes signiﬁcantly the operational modes of the different
infrastructures. Another aspect is that high impact, low frequency events may occur
that seldom that the analysis of recent events may overlook important CI depen-
dency aspects. This effect may be ampliﬁed by the fact that near missies in CI
disruptions are not reported and analysed outside the CI operator’s organisation, if
at all.
We also need to consider scenarios where several CI may be affects by a
common mode failure event so as to take into account the operative condition of the
different CI. Moreover, the relevance and impact of dependencies may largely be
influenced by the actual operative conditions [12].
All these aspects call for the availability of sophisticated analysis and simulation
tools, as illustrated in the next chapters of this book, while this chapter provides an
overview of a selection of relevant initiatives that are on-going in the sector of CI
protection and resilience.
3 Government Initiatives: Policies and Research
In this section we highlight a selection of international policies in order to identify
their focus and priorities with respect to CI and CIP.
The governments of different nations recognise the increasing importance of CI
protection and resilience. This is demonstrated by the policies they implement with
respect to CI at sectorial and cross-sectorial levels. In parallel, these policies are
frequently followed by funding to universities, national laboratories, and private
companies involved in the modelling, simulation and analysis (MS&A) of CI
dependencies (e.g. see [13]), which have further led to much innovative and diverse
work [14].
Overall, several nations have put in place a policy for critical infrastructure
protection (CIP) and also for critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP). In
the recent years, we also observe a shift of the focus from CIP towards
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infrastructure ‘resilience’,1 even if the two concepts are not easily distinguished.
The landscape of these national policies remains still very fragmented.
Moreover, government and international institutions recognised that to manage
the complexity of the problem at hand there is the need to develop new method-
ologies, paradigms and tools. To this end several programs have been set
up. Several scientiﬁc programs and institutions have been established in order to
protect and strengthen CI [14]. These initiatives include, among others, the US
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC), the European
Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP), the Critical
Infrastructure Program for Modeling and Analysis (CIPMA) in Australia, the
National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program (NCIAP) in Canada, the Dutch
Approach on Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Netherlands, the Critical
Infrastructure Resilience Program in the UK, and the Critical Infrastructure
Protection Implementation Plan in Germany. These initiatives provide a progress in
the knowledge of the problems at hand so as on the possible solutions. It is
interesting to note that up to 2008 the majority of R&D projects were related to
security at component level [13]. Some projects focused on strategic national ori-
ented aspects, and only few addressed problems induced by dependencies of
infrastructures. The presence of such R&D programs gave rise to the method-
ological and technological instruments to manage the complexity emerging from
dependencies among CI allowing to provide some operational tools to stakeholders,
decision makers and policy makers.
3.1 The US Approach
As described above, the increased relevance of CI was recognised in the US in the
mid 90s. In 1998, the Presidential Policy Directive No. 63 [1] on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) recognised the need to address vulnerabilities of CI
and the need for flexible, evolutionary approaches that span both the public and
private sectors, and protect both domestic and international security. A detailed
overview of how the CIP policy has developed in the US is presented in [17].
Currently, according to Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, “it is the policy of
the United States to strengthen the security and resilience of its critical infras-
tructure against both physical and cyber threats” [18]. CI is deﬁned by the
USA PATRIOT Act2 as:
1While there are no established European Union deﬁnitions of ‘resilience’ in the CI context, one
can still ﬁnd several non-ofﬁcial and more ofﬁcial deﬁnitions of the concept [15]. A suitable
generic deﬁnition, applicable also for CI, is provided by UNISDR [16]: “The ability of a system,
community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the
effects of a hazard in a timely and efﬁcient manner, including through the preservation and
restoration of its essential basic structures and functions” [16].
2§1016(e) of the United States Patriot Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. §5195c(e)).
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Systems and assets, physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national economic security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those
matters.
As explained in [17], the US federal government works with states, local
authorities, and the owners and operators of CI (in both the private and public
sector) to identify those speciﬁc assets and systems that constitute the nation’s CI.
Together, these entities perform a risk management approach for these assets, in
order to assess vulnerabilities to the threats facing the nation, assess risk, and
identify and prioritise a set of measures that can be taken to mitigate risk. The
approach is a voluntary one, with primary responsibility for action lying with the
owners and operators of CI. The federal government, however, will intervene in
case of inadequate protection or response.
According to Moteff’s overview of the US policies [17], PPD-21 on Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience made no major changes in policy, roles and
responsibilities, or programs. PPD-21, however, did order an evaluation of the
existing public-private partnership model, the identiﬁcation of baseline data and
system requirements for efﬁcient information exchange, and the development of a
situational awareness capability. PPD-21 also called for an update of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), and a new Research and Development Plan
for Critical Infrastructure, to be updated every four years.
While not yet making any changes in policy, roles and responsibilities, and
programs, the text of PPD-21 did reflect the increased interest in resilience and the
all-hazard approach that has evolved in CI policy over the last few years. It also
updated sector designations. However, highlighting the energy and communications
sectors due to their importance to the operations of other infrastructures. The
directive also required the updated NIPP [19] to include a focus on the reliance of
other sectors on energy and communications infrastructure and ways to mitigate the
associated risk. The latest policies have also focused efforts on expanding the cyber
security policies and programs associated with CIP.
An example of research initiative is the US National Infrastructure Simulation
and Analysis Center (NISAC), which is a modelling, simulation, and analysis
program within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) [20]. NISAC com-
prises an emergency support centre in the Washington, D.C. area, as well as
Modelling, Simulation and Analysis units at the Sandia National Laboratories
(SNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and the Paciﬁc Northwest
National Laboratory (PNNL). Congress mandated that NISAC serve as a “source of
national expertise to address critical infrastructure protection” research and analysis.
NISAC prepares and shares analyses of critical infrastructure, including their
dependencies, vulnerabilities, consequences, and other complexities, under the
direction of the Ofﬁce of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA). To ensure
consistency with CIP priorities, NISAC initiatives and tasking requests are coor-
dinated through the NISAC program ofﬁce. NISAC provides strategic, multidis-
ciplinary analyses of dependencies and the consequences of infrastructure
disruptions across all sixteen US CI sectors at national, regional, and local levels.
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NISAC experts have developed and are employing tools to address the complexities
of dependent national infrastructure, including process-based systems dynamics
models, mathematical network optimisation models, physics-based models of
existing infrastructure, and high-ﬁdelity agent-based simulations of systems.
The NISAC is managed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Ofﬁce
of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) to advance understanding of emerging
risk crossing the cyber-physical domain. NISAC’s Fast Analysis and Simulation
Team (FAST) provides practical information within severe time constraints in
response to issues of immediate national importance using NISAC’s long-term
planning and analysis results, expertise, and a suite of models including impact
models. Formerly known as Department’s Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk
Analysis Center (HITRAC), FAST allows to assist in emergency planning by
assessing CI resilience before and during a major emergency, e.g. a Katrina or
Sandy-like hurricane.
3.2 Initiatives in Europe
Reducing the vulnerabilities of CI and increasing their resilience is one of the major
objectives of the EU. The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure
Protection (EPCIP) sets the overall framework for activities aimed at improving the
protection of CI in Europe—across all EU States and in all relevant sectors of
economic activity [21]. The threats to which the programme aims to respond are not
only conﬁned to terrorism, but also include criminal activities, natural disasters, and
other causes of CI disruptions. In short, it seeks to provide an all-hazards
cross-sectorial approach. The EPCIP is supported by regular exchanges of infor-
mation between EU Member States in the frame of the CIP Contact Points
meetings.
EPCIP focuses on four main areas [21]:
• The creation of a procedure to identify and assess Europe’s CI and learn how to
better protect them.
• Measures to aid protection of CI including the establishment of expert groups at
EU level and the creation of the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information
Network (CIWIN)—an internet-based communication system for exchanging
information, studies, and best practices in Europe [22].
• Funding for over 100 CIP projects between 2007 and 2013. These projects
focused on a variety of issues including national and European information
sharing and alerting systems, the development of ways to assess the depen-
dencies between ICT and electricity transmission networks, and the creation of a
‘good practices’ manual for CIP policy makers [23].
• International cooperation with European Economic Area (EEA) and European
Free Trade Area (EFTA) nations, as well as expert meetings between the EU,
USA, and Canada.
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A key pillar of this programme is the 2008 Directive on European Critical
Infrastructures [6]. It establishes a procedure for identifying and designating
European Critical Infrastructures (ECI) and a common approach for assessing the
need to improve their protection. The Directive has a sectorial scope, applying only
to the energy and transport sectors. The 2008 Directive also requires
owners/operators of designated ECI to prepare Operator Security Plans (advanced
business continuity plans) and nominate Security Liaison Ofﬁcers (linking the
owner/operator with the national authority responsible for CIP). Classiﬁed
non-binding guidelines were also produced.
Taking into account the developments since the adoption of the 2006 EPCIP
Communication [21], an updated approach to the EU CIP policy became necessary.
Moreover, Article 11 of the 2008 Directive on the identiﬁcation and designation of
European Critical Infrastructures refers to a speciﬁc review process of the Directive.
Therefore, a comprehensive review has been conducted in close cooperation with
the Member States and stakeholders during 2012. In 2013, the European
Commission evaluated the progress made by EPCIP and suggested the programme
enter a new more practical phase for the future. This phase involves launching a
pilot project analysing four European Critical Infrastructures (ECI) with regards to
possible threats. These were:
• The EU’s electricity transmission grid
• The EU’s gas transmission network
• EUROCONTROL—the EU’s Air Trafﬁc Management
• GALILEO—the European programme for global satellite navigation.
Based on the results of this review and considering other elements of the current
programme, the Commission adopted a 2013 Staff Working Document on a new
approach to the EPCIP [24]. It sets out a revised and more practical implementation
of activities under the three main work streams—prevention, preparedness and
response. The new approach aims at building common tools and a common
approach in the EU to critical infrastructure protection and resilience, taking better
account of dependencies.
Compared with the US, the EU approach, though referring to national rather than
EU legislation, seems to be a step forward towards regulative efforts instead of mere
voluntary compliance, although both the US and the EU make emphasis on the
importance of public-private partnerships.
In terms of cyber resilience, the European Commission has adopted a series of
measures to raise Europe’s preparedness to ward off cyber incidents. The Directive
(EU) 2016/1148 of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of
security of network and information systems across the Union [25], also known as
the NIS-directive, is the ﬁrst piece of EU-wide legislation on cyber security. The
Directive focuses on three priorities: (a) Member States preparedness by requiring
them to be appropriately equipped, e.g. via a Computer Security Incident Response
Team (CSIRT) and a competent national NIS authority; (b) cooperation among all
the Member States, by setting up a cooperation group, in order to support and
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facilitate strategic cooperation and the exchange of information among Member
States; (c) a culture of security across sectors which are vital for our economy and
society and moreover rely heavily on ICT, such as energy, transport, water,
banking, ﬁnancial market infrastructures, healthcare and digital infrastructure.
Businesses in these sectors that are identiﬁed by the Member States as operators of
essential services will have to take appropriate security measures and to notify
serious incidents to the relevant national authority. Also key digital service pro-
viders (search engines, cloud computing services and online marketplaces) will
have to comply with the security and notiﬁcation requirements under the
NIS-Directive. The European Commission is also examining how to strengthen and
streamline cyber security cooperation across different sectors of the economy,
including in cyber security training and education.
While there are similarities, the European Commission has not formally con-
verged essential service operators and CI operators alike in [26]. Consequently, the
EU Member States can adopt legislative solutions that allow a substantial coinci-
dence of the two sets, or consider them as different set (with eventually some
overlap).
In terms of research, the European Commission has funded over 100 diverse
projects under the Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of
Terrorism and other Security-related Risks programme (CIPS), during the 2007–
2012 period. The programme was designed to protect citizens and CI from terrorist
attacks and other security incidents by fostering prevention and preparedness,
namely by improving the protection of CI and addressing crisis management. The
key objective is to support CIP policy priorities by providing expert knowledge and a
scientiﬁc basis for a better understanding of criticalities and dependencies at all
levels. A list of the EU co-funded projects can be found online [27]. Such projects
integrate the more than 300 R&D projects co-funded by the EU Commission under
the Security umbrella in the FP7 (i.e. the EU research funding agenda in the period
2007–2013). The programme covers all the aspects related with innovative tech-
nology for security, with a strong focus on security of CI. Amongst other projects
co-funded under this framework is the Network of Excellence “Critical Infrastructure
Preparedness and Resilience Research Network (CIPRNet)” project [28].
The interest for EU Commission about the security issues is witnessed by the
inclusion of the topic security also in the H2020 programme (i.e. the Horizon 2020
programme is the EU research funding agenda for the period 2014–2020) and by
the more than 150 R&D projects already granted. To be more effective, H2020
shifted the focus from technology driven perspective to a problem solving orien-
tation with a strong requirements of active involving of security stakeholders,
starting from CI operators, in order to develop solution able to concretely increase
the resilience, the robustness and/or the preparedness of EU society.
Finally, a European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection
(ERNCIP) has been created by the European Commission to “foster the emergence
of innovative, qualiﬁed, efﬁcient and competitive security solutions, through
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networking of European experimental capabilities”. It aims to link together existing
European laboratories and facilities, in order to carry out critical
infrastructure-related security experiments and test new technology, such as
detection equipment.
3.3 The Australian Approach
This Australian Government recognises the importance of CI and focuses its policy
on the essential services for everyday life provided by parts of CI. In its 2010 CI
Resilience Strategy, we observe a shift towards resilience that enables an all hazards
approach [29]. The Australian strategy takes into account the dependencies between
critical infrastructures and sectors. It deﬁnes resilience in the context of CI, as:
Coordinated planning across sectors and networks, responsive, flexible and timely recovery
measures, and development of an organisational culture that has the ability to provide a
minimum level of service during interruptions, emergencies and disasters, and return to full
operations quickly.
Like in the USA and Europe, the Australian Government aims to build a
public-private partnership approach between businesses and government and has
established the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) for Critical
Infrastructure Resilience (CIR) as its primary mechanism. The goal is to establish a
cross-sector approach and the identiﬁcation of cross-sector dependencies.
This strategy identiﬁes six strategic aspects:
• operate an effective business-government partnership with critical infrastructure
owners and operators
• develop and promote an organisational resilience body of knowledge and a
common understanding of organisational resilience
• assist owners and operators of CI to identify, analyse and manage cross-sectorial
dependencies
• provide timely and high quality policy advice on issues relating to CI resilience
• implement the Australian Government’s Cyber Security Strategy to maintain a
secure, resilient and trusted electronic operating environment, including for CI
owners and operators, and
• support the CI resilience programs delivered by Australian States and
Territories, as agreed and as appropriate.
While some of these activities are a continuation of the previous CIP Program, a
new strategic imperative, the one of organisational resilience, emerges.
The Critical Infrastructure Program for Modelling and Analysis (CIPMA) is part
of the Australian Government’s strategy to: (a) reduce exposure to risk, (b) recover
from major disruptions and disasters, (c) learn from incidents. CIPMA uses a vast
array of data and information to model and simulate the behaviour of CI systems
and how they interrelate. Governments and CI owners and operators can use
CIPMA’s modelling and analysis toolset and approach to help prevent, prepare for,
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respond to, or recover from, a natural or human-caused disruption to CI. It draws on
all its partners to do so, including other owners and operators of CI, state and
territory governments, and Australian Government agencies. CIPMA also supports
the work of the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) for CI resilience. The
network is a forum for owners and operators of CI and governments to share
information.
4 CI Resilience
As we observed in the previous section, the Australian strategy has followed a clear
direction towards CI Resilience (CIR). The main argument is that due to the
adverse and changing landscape of hazards and threats to CI, it is not possible to
foresee, prevent, prepare for or mitigate all of these events, which in several cases
can be unknown or emergent. Moreover:
Protective security measures alone cannot mitigate supply chain disruption, nor ensure the
rapid restoration of services. Owners and operators of critical infrastructure often have
limited capacity to continue operations indeﬁnitely if the essential goods and services they
require are interrupted [29].
As highlighted in [30], both the USPPD-21 [18] and NIPP 2013 [19] recognise
CIP “as an enabler of CIR” (Critical Infrastructure Resilience). While the US
approach currently recognises resilience alongside protection, or perhaps even
emphasises the former at the cost of the latter [19], it is noteworthy that this
approach places its emphasis on public-private partnership in the spirit of voluntary
measures from the private side. This approach is different than the European
policies, which focus more on regulatory measures.
In [30] it is highlighted that the Staff Working Document [24] already includes
several references to the concept of resilience and it indeed uses the phrase “CI
protection and resilience” frequently. Usually these two concepts are presented
together, but the document does not explicitly deﬁne either of the concepts nor
make it clear how they differ from each other and how they are related. In one
occasion, however, when discussing the four “relevant pan-European critical
infrastructures” that are to be used as European pilot projects from 2013 onwards, it
is mentioned that the respective work streams “seek to provide useful tools for
improving protection and resilience, including through providing for strengthened
risk mitigation, preparedness and response measures”.
Currently, there are not many national, ofﬁcial deﬁnitions of the concept of CI
Resilience, but as we observed, several national policy and strategy reports include
it as a key component in their CIP programs, which depicts a shift of the CIP ﬁeld
towards Resilience.
Looking at the different deﬁnitions and approaches, one can notice commonal-
ities and differences [15]. Alsubaie et al. [31] observes that properties such as
‘ability to recover’ and ‘ability to adapt’ were incorporated in several deﬁnitions.
Most of the proposed deﬁnitions include ‘the ability to withstand’ or ‘absorb’ a
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disturbance as a key attribute. Similarly, Bruneau et al. [32] assigns four properties
to resilience for both physical and social systems: robustness, redundancy,
resourcefulness, and rapidity.
In another review of resilience concepts used for CI, Francis and Bekera [33]
observes the evolution in the resilience concept and also concludes that the deﬁ-
nitions seem to converge “in the direction of a common deﬁnition, as these deﬁ-
nitions share several common elements: absorptive capacity, recoverability,
adaptive capacity, and retention of identity (structure and functions)”. They argue
that the objective of resilience is to retain predetermined dimensions of system
performance and identity or structure in view of forecasted scenarios.
Three resilience capacities, i.e. absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capacities
[33, 34] are at the centre of these approaches and are linked with the various stages
of typical infrastructure response cycle to disruption (before, during and after the
event). In Francis and Bekera [33] the following resilience capacities for infras-
tructures are deﬁned:
– Absorptive capacity refers to the degree to which a system can absorb the
impacts of system perturbations and minimise consequences with little effort. In
practice, though, it is a management feature depending on conﬁguration, con-
trols, and operational procedures. System robustness and reliability are proto-
typical pre-disruption characteristics of a resilient system.
– While absorptive capacity is the ability of a system to absorb system pertur-
bations, adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to adjust to undesirable
situations by undergoing some changes. A system’s adaptive capacity is
enhanced by its ability to anticipate disruptive events, recognise unanticipated
events, re-organise after occurrence of an adverse event, and general pre-
paredness for adverse events.
– Restorative capacity of a resilient system is often characterised by rapidity of
return to normal or improved operations and system reliability. This capacity
should be assessed against a deﬁned set of requirements derived from a desirable
level of service or control.
In their approach, Alsubaie et al. [31] recognise that it is important to take into
account the inherent interdependencies that exist among most of the modern CI. In
this respect, proposed resilience concepts and measures need to incorporate CI
dependencies, considering the cascade of a failure through multiple CIs, which offer
different services to the community. This dependency of resilience between com-
munities and infrastructure has been widely recognised in the scientiﬁc literature
[35] and is also depicted in the Australian CIP Strategy [29].
As pointed out in [15], resilience encompass several dimensions; such as
technical, organisational, social, and economic ones. In summary, the technolog-
ical dimension refers primarily to the physical properties of infrastructure compo-
nents, systems, networks or ‘system-of-systems’ and refer to the characteristics and
behaviour of these in the case of a change or incident. This dimension is very
prominent when referring to engineering resilience or to CIR and it is the aspect
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most of the modelling, simulation and analysis tools and approaches focus on.
Another aspect relevant to CIR is the organisational one, as it relates to the
organisations and institutions that manage the physical components of the systems,
i.e. CI operators or owners. It covers aspects such as culture, people, business
continuity, risk, and disaster management at the organisational level. This more
business-oriented aspect, which we have observed in the Australian national policy,
serves as a way to gather all current business practices under one common goal: the
operability of the infrastructure under adverse circumstances. The social dimension
encompasses population and community characteristics that render social groups
either more vulnerable or more adaptable to hazards and disasters. We observe that
national resilience policies recently include, except of economic or even environ-
mental aspects, social aspects in their deﬁnitions of resilience as CI are vital for
maintaining key societal functions. These refer to the community and highlight how
infrastructures contribute with essential services to it, e.g. as discussed in the
aforementioned NIS Directive.
Overall, a resilience-based approach for CI is an approach that is gradually
adopted by nations in order to face the challenges and costs of achieving maximum
protection in an increasingly complex environment and to overcome limitations of
the traditional scenario-based risk management approach, where the organisation
may lack capabilities to face risk from unknown or unforeseen threats and
vulnerabilities.
5 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the concept of Critical Infrastructure (CI) and their pro-
tection. It has illustrated which factors contribute to the complexity of modern
infrastructures, as well as the needs that drive scientists to develop modelling,
simulation and analysis (MS&A) tools for this area. This interest in CI and complex
systems is strongly related to initiatives, by several governments that from the end
of the 90s of the previous century recognised the relevance of the undisturbed
functioning of CI for the wellbeing of their population. They also stimulated the
research community and gave rise to several projects, a selection of which was
presented in this chapter.
In the past years, international policies and their respective research programs
have shifted towards a resilience-based approach. While the different nations
continue to work in areas such as risk management, protection, dependency mod-
elling and analysis, etc., resilience gains a more prominent role, as the ‘umbrella’
term to cover all the various aspects and the various stages of crisis management
when a critical infrastructure faces a disruptive event.
In the following chapters, we will focus on modelling, simulation and analysis
and explore how such methods and tools can contribute to a better understanding of
CI complexity and can be used in order to improve the protection and resilience of
infrastructures.
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